Abstract
Purpose: This study attempts to analyze the influence of board structure (board size, board independence, CEO duality, insider ownership) on performance of Bangladeshi listed nonfinancial firms during the post-shock period of stock prices.
Methodology: Putting stress on the issue of controlling for any possible endogeneity problems prevails in the effects of structure of board on corporate performance this study employed the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test as the presence of endogeneity severely makes the OLS estimates biased. Therefore, satisfying endogeneity and overidentification tests the observed data have been analyzed by 2SLS as well as OLS regression models. In an attempt to choose the consistent coefficients between OLS and 2SLS a Hausman test was applied.
Findings: Results of the study suggest that a board featuring more directors improve accounting measures of performance and a board having more independent directors also significantly assist firms to enhance their market measure of performance. CEO duality is found detrimental to the accounting measures of performance. Apart from, findings support that holding more ownership by insiders leads to enhance firm performance. Thus, it provides empirical evidence to support a view of agency theory that large board, board independence, and insider ownership are good incentives to the firm to monitor and supervise managerial activities and minimize agency problems.
Practical Implication: Overall, findings of the study are posing some implications for academics, practitioners, and policy makers in advancing the existing knowledge domain and formulating governance policies in the context of emerging countries like Bangladesh.
Originality: The driving force of this work was to investigate how effective the corporate governance directives/notifications in regard to board independence and insider ownership was in protecting the shareholders’ interest during the post-shock period of stock prices in Bangladesh. Therefore, this study provides a robust result with regard to the impacts of reformed corporate governance notification (CGN 2012) on firm performance in Bangladesh.